CRIMINAL JURISDICTION.

THE ELEMENT OF LOCALITY IN THE LAW OF
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION.
THE Federal Courts have no common law criminal jurisdiction. The question was raised in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, in 1798, in United
States v. Worrall, 2 Dallas, 384, and the Court was equally
divided in opinion. Iii 1818, Mr. Justice STORY, in United
States v. Coolidge, 1 Gallison, 488, decided that there were
common law offences against the United States. But this,
as we shall see, was overruled by the Supreme Court. As
early as 1807, Chief Justice MARSHALL, in Ex parte .Bollman,
4 Cranch, 75, had said, "This Court disclaims all jurisdiction not given by the Constitution, or by the laws of the
United States. Courts which originate in the common law
possess a jurisdiction which must be regulated by the common law, until some statute shall change their established
principles; but courts which are created by written law, and
whose jurisdiction is defined by written law, cannot transcend
that jurisdiction." This was a statement of general doctrine, and it remained for the Court to make an application
of the principle to the matter we are discussing, in 1812, in
United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32, where it was decided
that the Courts of the United States have no common law
jurisdiction in criminal cases, the Court remarking that, "althoughthis question is brought up now for the first time to
be decided by this Court, we consider it as having been long
since settled in public opinion." But in 1816 the question
was again presented and similarly ruled on, although it
appears that a difference of opinion existed at that time
among the members of the Court: United States v. Coolidge,
1 Wheaton, 415. Whatever doubt may, at one time, have
existed on this subject, it is now settled beyond controversy,
that the Federal government has no common law jurisdiction
of criminal matters: United States v. Lancaster, 2 McLean,
431, 433 (1841) ; United States v. Taylor, 1 Hughes, 514, 518
(1874); United States v. Shepherd, Id. 520, 522 (1875).
The Constitution of the United States, in its first Article
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and eighth section, declares that the Congress shall have
power "to define and punish piracies and felonies committed
on the high seas, and offences against the Law of Nations.;'
In accordance with the power thus conferred, the government
has declared that certain acts done on "the high seas, or in
Iany arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or
Ibay, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular
State," shall be crimes against the United States, and punishable in its Courts: Revised Statutes of the United States,
Title LXX., ch. 3. A ship on the high seas is a floating
part of the territory of the State to which it belongs: Ex
parte Byers, U. S. Dist. Ct. E. Dist. Mich., 32 Fed. R. 404,
410 (1887). But when a merchant vessel of one country
enters the ports of another, for the purposes of trade, it subjects itself to the law of the place to which it goes, and
the Courts of that country can punish crimes committed on
such foreign ships: Wildenhus' Case, 120 U. S. 1 (1886).
The law as to crimes committed on the Great Lakes has
not been in all respects satisfactory. Under the power "to
regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
several States," the Congress has undoubted authority to
protect the lives and property of persons navigating those
waters, but the failure to exercise the power has led to a
denial of justice in important cases. This subject was recently before the District Court of the United States for
the Eastern District of Michigan, in the case of -Ex parte
.Byers, supra. In that case Mr. Justice BROWN was of
the opinion that the State Courts had at that time exclusive
jurisdiction of crimes committed on the lakes, and their
connecting waters, upon the American side of the boundary
line, Congress not having enacted any law as to offences
committed in such waters. And he was also of the opinion,
that the Federal Courts had no jurisdiction over a crime
committed upon the Canadian side of such waters, holding
that the Great Lakes and their connecting waters were not
included within the words used in the Revised Statutes
of the United States, conferring jurisdiction on the Federal
Courts, that is, the words "high seas, or river, haven,
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creek, basin, or bay, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the
United States." He said: "That the lakes are not ' high
seas'is too clear for argument. These words have been employed from time immemorial to designate the ocean below
low water-mark, and have rarely, if ever, been applied to interior or land-locked waters of any description. * ** -Now,
it seems incredible, that, if Congress had designed to extend
the Act of 1790 to the Great Lakes, a series of waters entirely
separate, distinct and distant from the high seas and their
connection, it should not at least have inserted the word
' lakes,' or have used the still more explicit language to designate those interior waters. The words ' haven, creek,
basin, or bay, within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United
States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State,'
following the words 'high seas,' seem to me clearly to be
such as are connected immediately with the high seas, and to
be much the same as the words ' arm of the sea,' in the same
section. While the word ' river' may be properly used to designate the straits which connect Lake Huron and Lake Erie,
it would be little short of absurd to impute to Congress the
intent to give criminal jurisdiction to those rivers, and
not to the lakes from and into which they flow." The Court
therefore reluctantly ordered the discharge of the prisoner,
who had committed a crime on the Canadian side of the
straits connecting the waters of Lake Erie and Lake Huron.
It is provided in section 3 of Article IV. of the Constitution of the United States, that "The Congress shall have
power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging
to the United States." Under this provision Congress has
unquestionably full power to govern the Territories, and it
may enact such laws, and establish such criminal and civil
codes for the protection of life and property within the Territories, as in its wisdom shall seem desirable. But when
Congress, admits a Territory to Statehood, the Federal government loses this power of legislation, and its right of jurisdiction over criminal offences becomes transferred to the State
itself. This admission of the State does not divest the United
States of its title to any of the public lands situated within
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the State limits, but its jurisdiction over those lands is as
completely gone as it is over the lands owned by private persons situated within the same State limits. Thus in United
States v. Stahl, 1 Woolworth, C. C. 192 (1868), a crime had
been committed on land within the boundaries of the State of
Kansas, the fee of the land having been in the government of
the United States prior to the organization of Kansas into a
Territory, and it had ever since so continued. Mr. Justice
MILL-ER held that the Federal Courts had no jurisdiction over
the offence; that in admitting Kansas into the Union, the
government of the United States became divested, not of its
title to the soil in question, but of its jurisdiction over the
same.
Of course, the same principle must be applied in the case
of crimes committed on land to which the United States
becomes entitled after the admission of the State. The jurisdiction of the State having once attached to the soil in question, cannot be taken away from it by the mere subsequent
purchase of the land by the United States: United States v.
Penn,4 Hughes, 491 (1880); where it was held that the Federal Courts were without jurisdiction of offences committed
in the National Cemetery, on the heights of the Potomac,
opposite Washington.
The Constitution, however, provides that Congress shall
exercise exclusive legislation "over all places purchased )y the
consent of the Legislature of the State, in which the same shall
be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards,
and other needful buildings." Under this provision the State
Courts are deprived of jurisdiction over offences committed
in the places above enumerated, the jurisdiction being dependent on the laws of the United States, and not at all on those
of the State. The question was raised in 1884 in the Supreme Court of Maine, in State v. Kelly, 76 Me. 831. A
mortal blow or wound had been inflicted within a fort belonging to the United States, within the boundaries of Maine.
The injured person died outside the fort, but within the State
of Maine, and the person who inflicted the wound was
indicted in the State Courts. The Court held that the crime
was committed when the blow was struck, and not when the
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person died, and that therefore the Courts of the United
States had jurisdiction over the offence, and that their jurisdiction was exclusive of that of the State. And it was further
held that a State statute, declaring that the Courts of a county
in which a person should die of a mortal wound elsewhere
received, should have jurisdiction of the offence, was wholly
inapplicable to the case of one whose mortal wound was received within a fort of the United States. And see Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72 (1811).
However, the mere fact that a place is owned and occupied
by the United States as a fort, arsenal, magazine, etc., does
not necessarily give to the United States jurisdiction over
offences therein committed. Where a place occupied by the
United States for military, or other constitutional purposes,
is located within a State, but has not been reserved by the
United States in the organic Act, or in the Act admitting
the territory into the Union, and where there has been no
cession of such place by the State to the United States, the
State Courts, and not the Federal Courts, have jurisdiction
over crimes committed therein. And this is so though the
place may have been constantly occupied and used by the
United States, whether under purchase or without purchase.
The question was presented to the Supreme Court of New
York in 1819 in People v. Godfrey, 17 Johnson, 225. The
defendant had been convicted of murder, committed within
the walls of Fort Niagara. The prisoner and the deceased
were fellow soldiers in the army of the United States, and the
deceased, for some military offence, was under the custody of
the accused in the "black hole," when the latter stabbed him
with a bayonet, causing his death. The prisoner was placed
on trial in the State Court, and claimed that the Federal
Courts alone had jurisdiction 6ver his offence, as having been
committed within a fort of the United States. It appeared
that Fort Niagara was captured from the French in 1759,
and passed, by virtue of the treaty of peace of 1763, to the
Crown of Great Britain, and that it continued to be held by
that power, as a fortress, until it was surrendered under the
treaty of 1794, since which time it had been possessed and
garrisoned by the United States. It was within the acknow-

CRIMINAL JURISDICTION.

ledged limits of the State of New York, and had never been
formerly ceded by the State to the United States. The Supreme Court of the State of New York decided, Chief Justice
SPENCER writing the opinion, that the State Courts had jurisdiction of the offence. They held that it was beyond all
doubt that the United States acquired no territorial rights to
any portion of the State of New York, in virtue of the
treaties of 1783 and 1794, and that, when Great Britain, in
accordance with these treaties, withdrew its garrisons from
any place, it was for the benefit of the several States within
whose limits the garrisons were. And they further held,
that the occupation of the fort by the troops of the United
States, since its evacuation by the British, could not be considered as evidence of a right in the general government to
the post itself, nor as an act hostile to the rights of the State
of New York. A somewhat similar question came before
the Supreme Courf of Kansas, in respect to a crime cemmitted on the military reservation at Fort Leavenworth. That
reservation had been acquired by the United States as a part
of the Territory of Louisiana, and had been used for military
purposes. But in the organic Act, and in the Act admitting
the Territory as a State, there bad been no reservation of
jurisdiction over the soil in question. And there never had
been any cession of the property by the State to the United
States. It was accordingly held in Clay v. State, 4 Kansas,
49 (1866), that the State Courts had jurisdiction of the offence
of larceny committed within Fort Leavenworth.
The question of jurisdiction over offences committed upon
Indian Reservations has lieen before the Courts in a number
of cases. The principle has been laid down that when a Territory is admitted as a State, without any reservation in the
enabling or organic Act, the Federal Courts have no jurisdiction over offences committed within what are known as Indian Reservations. Thus in United States v. Ward, 1 Woolworth C. C. 17 (1868), a white man had been indicted for the
murder of a white man committed on an Indian Reservation
in Kansas, and it was held that the Federal Courts were without jurisdiction. And on a similar state of facts, the State
Courts of Nebraska held that they had jurisdiction over au
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offence committed by one white man on another, within an
Indian Reservation in that State: MAiarion v. State, 16 Neb.
858 (1884); s. c. 20 Id. 238, 247 (1886). In the above cases,
the crimes were committed by wh, te men upon white men.
There is, however, no question but that the State can punish
its own citizens for crimes committed on such territory
against the Indians. See U. S. v. Cisna, 1 McLean, 254, 263
(1835). Of course, if the United States, in the organic or enabling Act, admitting the State to the Union, reserved its jurisdiction over the Indian Reservations, within the outside
boundaries of such State, the jurisdiction over offences committed in such places would, unquestionably, be in the United
States Courts. See United States v. Rogers, 4 How. (U. S.)
567, 572 (1846). When, however, the State comes in without any such restrictions or reservations, it has been held to
have the right to extend its criminal laws over Indians living
oil the Reservations: State v. Foreman, 8 Yerger (Tenn.),
256 (1835); State v. Tassels, Dudley (Ga.), 229 (1830); State
v. Ta-cha-na-tah, 64 N. C. 614 (1870); State v. Doxtater, 47
Wis. 278 (1879); State v. XlKenney, 18 Nev. 182 (1883). In
the case last above cited, it was decided that while the State
had the right to extend its criminal laws over Indians living
in tribal relations o.n Reservations, yet State laws do not
apply to them unless they are so expressed. And it was held
that the State Courts of Nevada had no jurisdiction over an
offince committed by an Indian on an Indian, both of whom
were members of an organized tribe, living on a Reservation,
and having laws for the government of their internal affairs.
But the Supreme Court of the United States has recently
made a very important decision on the subject we are now
considering. In United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375
(1886), that Court decides, Mr. Justice MILLER writing the
opinion, that Congress can constitutionally pass a law, making
it a crime for one Indian to commit murder upon another Indian, upon an Indian Reservation, situated wholly within
the limits of a State, and making the Indian so offending
subject to be tried in the same Courts and in the same
manner and subject to the same penalties as are all other
persons committing the crime of murder "within the exclu-
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sive jurisdiction of the United States."

It had previously

been held that Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional
power to regulate intercourse with the Indian tribes, might
define and punish crimes committed by white men upon the
person or property of an Indian, and vice versa, within as
well as without the limits of a State: United States v. Martin,
8 Sawyer, 473 (1883); United States v. Bridleran,7 Id. 243
(1881). But the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States, above referred to, is placed on the broad ground that
the Indians are the wards of the United States and that the
government has the right to protect them.
We have hitherto considered crimes committed on Indian
Reservations. But a word must be added as to crimes committed by Indians off their Reservations. It has been decided
that United States Courts have no jurisdiction over Indians,
living on Indian Reservations, who commit crimes on white
men, while off their Reservations. The Courts of the State in
which the crime is committed, have jurisdiction in such cases:
United States v. Yellow Sun, 1 Dillon, 271 (1870). And to the
same point, see United States v. Sacoodaeot, 1 Abbott (U. S.
C. C.) 377 (1870). "
Each State possesses exclusive power to provide for the
punishment of offences within its own limits, except in so far
as its power may have been surrendered to the government
of the United States by the Federal Constitution: State v.
Chapman, 17 Ark. 561, 565 (1856). And within the State,
crimes must be tried in the county in which the criminal act
was committed: State v. Wyckoff, 31 N{. J. L. 65, 68 (1864).
It is a very old rule of the common law that requires every
offence tried in the common law Courts, to be inquired of in
the county where the act took place. The peculiar character
of the early jury affords an explanation and reason for the
rule. Jurors were originally witnesses as well as triers, and
were expected to act upon their own knowledge of the facts
involved, and of the character of the witnesses on either side.
But when they became simply triers of fact, the rule was
already firmly established, and it was seen that there were
marked and strong advantages in selecting the jurors from
the county in which the crime had been committed. It would
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be a great burden and injustice, if a man could be carried to
a distant part of the State and compelled there to make his
defence at a distance from the place in which the act complained of occurred. And so the old rule was retained, even
after the original reason for its existence had ceased. The
same principle is observed in the criminal jurisdiction of the
Federal government. For the judicial purposes of that
government, the States are not divided into counties, but are
organized into districts. In some of the States there is but
one judicial district, while in others there are two or, more
of them. And the sixth amendment to the Constitution of
the United States declares that "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed." The denial of the right
to a trial by a jury of the vicinage is one of the causes which
led to a separation from the mother country. The Declaration of Independence arraigns George III.: "For transporting
us beyond seas, to be tried for pretended offences."
Personal presence at the place where the crime is perpetrated, or even within the State where the crime is committed,
is not always indispensable to confer jurisdiction on the Courts
of such place or State. For while the offender may not be
corporally present, he may be there by the instrument or
agent used to effect his purpose. If a person outside the
State acts within the State through an innocent agent, he is
amenable to the law of the State. Thus in Barkhamsted v.
-Parsons,8 Conn. 1, 8 (1819), it is said: "The principle of
common law, quifacit per alium, facit per se, is of universal
application, both in criminal and civil cases, and he who does
an act in this State by his agent, is considered as if he had
done it in his own proper person." 'And so in The People v.
Adams, 3 Denio, 190, 210 (1846), where it is said: "True,
the defendant was not personally within this State, but he
was here in purpose and design, and acted by his authorized
agents. Qui facit per alium, facit per se. The agents employed were innocent, and he alone was guilty. An offence
was thus committed, and there must have been a guilty
offender, for it would be somewhat worse than absurd to hold
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that any act could be a crime, if no one was criminal. Here
the crime was perpetrated within this State, and over that
our Courts have an undoubted jurisdiction. This necessarily
gives to them jurisdiction over the criminal. Crimen trahit
personam2'
When one is guilty only as an accessory before the fact,
the rule has been that he can only be tried in the place where
his guilty act of accessoryship took place. Thus, when several
persons entered into a conspiracy in Ohio to burn a steamboat,
and the boat was burned in Arkansas, the Supreme Court of
the latter State held that one of the confederates, who had
remained in Ohio and was simply art accessory before the
fact, could not be tried in the Courtg of Arkansas: ,State v.
Chapin, 17 Ark. 561 (1856). And so when the accused made
arrangements in New York with a confederate to go into New
Jersey and steal certain property, which the latter did, the
former remaining in New York, it was held that the
former, being simply an accessory before the fact, could
not be tried in the Courts cf New Jersey: jState v. Wyckoff,
supra. And other cases there are to the same effect: Johns
v. State, 19 Ind. 421 (1862); State v. .Moore, 26 N. H. 448
(1853). This doctrine was repudiated by the Supreme Court
of Connecticut, in State v. Grady, 34 Conn. 118 (1867). The
defendants conspired, with certain accomplices, in the city of
New York, to commit the crime of larceny in the State of
Connecticut, and the larceny was accordingly committed. It
was claimed as to certain of the defendants, that the Connecticut Court had no jurisdiction to try them, notwithstanding they had assisted in the initiation of the plot in New
York, inasmuch as they did not come into the State and assist
personally in the commission of The crime. But it was held
that the Court might punish their offence, having obtained
jurisdiction of their person. As the question is quite important, it may be well to notice the grounds upon which the
conclusion was based. The Court say: "The general proposition that no man is to suffer criminally for what he does
out of the territorial limits of the country, if applied to a case
where the act is completed out of the country, is correct; but
it is the highest injustice that a man should be protected in
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doing a criminal act here, because he is personally out of the
State. His act is here, although he is not. * * * The reason
given for the distinction is, that, if the offence is a felony, he
sustains the relation to it, if performed by a guilty agent who
can be punished, of an accessory, and not of a principal, and
that, as technically an accessory, he must be pursued in the
locality where he committed the enticement. The doctrine
has never been recognized in this State, is inconsistent with
our system of criminal law, and does not commend itself to
our judgment. In the first place, it has not been recognized
here. There has been no case in our Courts where the prisoner has been indicted and acquitted, because, although a
party to the offence, he was not in the State at the time it was
committed. *

* *

In the second place, the doctrine is incon-

sistent with our system of criminal law. By express statutory provision we have done away with the distinction between principal and accessory in felony: and every person
who aids and assists in the commission of a crime, or the
protection of a criminal, is made a principal, and punishable
and indictable as such.

* * *

And in the third place, the

doctrine, as applicable to this country, is vicious, and should
be repudiated. It originated, as Mr. Bishop tells us, in the
blunder of some judge. * * * The blunder was corrected by
the statute of Edward VI., Chap. 24, §4, which provided that
such accessory might also be indicted in the county where
the offence was committed. It would seem that a rule thus
originating in a blunder, and applicable only in respect to
counties in the State where the offence is committed, and
corrected by express statute, and favoring the commission of
crime, ought not to be adopted and applied to States situated
as these are, tied together by a ligament giving to the citizens of each, citizenship in all." And see State v. Ayers, 8
Baxter (Tenn.) 96 (1874).
It is not within our purpose to discuss the question of who
is an accessory before the fact, and who is not. But we cannot forbear in this connection calling attention to the interesting case of State v. iamilton, 13 Nev. 386 (1878). Certain persons had conspired to rob a stage on its way from
Eureka in Eureka County, to a place in Nye County in the
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same State of Nevada. One of the confederates was to remain at Eureka and make a signal to his confederates in
Nye County, some forty miles distant, when the stage left Eureka, the signal being given by building a fire on the top of
a mountain. And the question was whether this confederate,
whose act was performed in Eureka County, he having built
the fire as agreed, could be held in Nye County for an attempt
to rob there, he not having been present in the latter county
when his confederates attacked the stage. And it was decided that *hemight be tried in Nye County, not as an accessory before the fact, but as a principal, the law being that
when several persons confederate together. for the purpose of
committing a crime, which is to be accomplished in pursuance of a common plan, all who do any act which contributes
to the accomplishment of their design, are principals, whether
actually present or not.
According to the common law, the crime of bigamy occurs
and is complete at the time and place when the second marriage is accomplished. The offence consists in going through
the ceremony of marriage. That single fact constitutes the
crime, and not the subsequent cohabitation: Gise v. Commonwealth, 81 Pa. 428 (1876). The result is that an indictment for bigamy must be found in the county and State in
which the bigamous marriage was entered into. Thus in
Walls v. The State, 32 Ark. 565 (1877), the second marriage
was contracted in the county of Woodruff, Arkansas, and
the indictment for bigamy was found in Jackson County in
the same State. This indictment was based on a statute
which allowed the person to be tried for bigamy in any
county where he was apprehended, and this law was held
unconstitutional. The Court ruled that an indictment for
bigamy could only be found in the county where the bigamous
marriage was celebrated.
In cases of homicide, where the blow was struck in one
county and death resulted therefrom in a different county,
there seems in early times to have been some doubt as to the
proper place of trial. East declares that the common opinion
was that the criminal might be indicted where the stroke
was given, no matter where the death took place: 1 East P.
VOL. XXXVII.-3
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C. 361. But, whatever of doubt may have existed, it is now
very well settled by-the weight of authority that the crime
of murder is committed when the blow is struck, irrespective
of the place where the death occurs: State v. Gessert,21 Minn.
369(1865); Commonwealth v. Parker-,2 Pick. (Mass.) 550(1824) ;
State v. Bowen, 16 Kans. 475, 479 (1876); Riley v. State, 9
Humph. (Tenn.) 646 (1849) ;United States v. Guiteau, 1 Mackey,
D. 0. 498; Green v. State, 66 Ala-40 (1880). And see State v.
lkte Coy, 8 Rob. R. (La.) 545 (1844); State v. Foster, 7 La. Ann.
255 (1852). In the first of the cases cited, the blow was
inflicted in Minnesota and death took place in Wisconsin.
The Minnesota Court held that it had jurisdiction over the
offence; that the death in Wisconsin was not the act of the
accused committed in Wisconsin, but the consequence of his
act committed in Minnesota, against the peace and dignity of
the latter State.
In United States v. Davis, 2 Sumner (U. S. C. C.) 482-, an
American sailor in an American ship in one of the Society
Islands harbors fired a shot, which killed a man in a foreign
ship. The Court, Mr. Justice STORY, held that the murder
was committed when the blow was struck, and as the deceased
was struck while on a foreign ship, our Courts had no jurisdiction over the offence.
So, when a person standing on one side of a boundary line
fires across the same and kills a man standing in another
State, the murder is committed in the latter State, when the
shot takes effect: State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561, 565 (1856);
State v. TVyckoff, supra; State v. Carter, 27 N. J. L. 499
(1859).
Some of the States have enacted thatif a mortal wound is
inflicted outside the State and death ensues therefrom within
the State, the offence may be prosecuted and punished in the
county within the State, wherein such death may take place.
The constitutionality of a statute of this kind was called in
question in Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 321 (1860), and it was
said to be "clearly within the scope of the legislative power."
But the opinion does not discuss the matter at any length,
although the subject is extensively considered in a dissenting
opinion-of one of the justices, who found himself unable-to,
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acquiesce in the conclusion reached by the Court. The same
question was afterwards presented to the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. .acloon, 101 Mass. 1
(1869). The matter was carefully considered and a like conclusion was reached, the constitutionality of the Act being
upheld. The contrary doctrine was asserted in New Jersey
in The State v. Carter,3 Dutcher, 499 (1859). But see Hunter
v. The State, 40 N. J. L. 495 (1878), and Queen v. Lewis,
7 Cox C. C. 277 (1857).
Many of the States have provided by statute, that, when
the commission of an offence is commenced within the State,
but is consummated without its boundaries, the offender is
liable to punishment within the State, and that the county in
which the offence is commenced, shall have jurisdiction thereof. The validity of such a statute was called in question in
Green v. State, 66 Ala. 40 (1880), on the ground that its enactment was beyond the scope of legitimate legislative power,
as the penal laws of a State could not operate beyond its own
territorial domain. The objection was held untenable and
the statute sustained. In that case, a mortal wound was inflicted in Alabama and death occurred in Georgia, and it was
held that the offender might, under this statute, be properly
convicted of murder in Alabama, irrespective of the common
law rule that murder is committed when the blow is struck,
irrespective of the place of death.
In the law of larceny, the principle is well established that,
if one steals goods in one county and carries them into a
second county in the same State, he may be indicted for the
theft in either county: State v. Douglas, 17 Me. 193 (1840);
Commonwealth v. Cullins, 1 Mass. 116 (1804); Commonwealth
v. Dewitt, 10 Id. 154 (1813); State v. Somerville, 21 Me. 14,
19 (1842); Myers v. The People, 26 Ill. 173, 177 (1861); State
v. Margerum, 9 Baxter (Tenn.), 362 (1878); The People v.
Burke, 11 Wend. (N. Y.)129, 130 (1834).
But this is no contradiction of the principle that a crime is
to be punished in the county where it was committed. The
indictment in the second county is for the larceny committed
in that county, and not for that which was committed in the
first county. The legal possession of goods stolen continues
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in the owner, and every moment's continuance of the trespass
is said to amount in legal contemplation to a new caption
and asportation. Hence the venue may be laid in any county
in the State into which the thief conveys them, as the offence
of taking and converting is there in itself complete. Some
of the earlier American decisions decline to apply this principle when goods have been stolen in one State and carried by
the thief into another State. They have held that under
such circumstances the thief could not be indicted for larceny
in the latter State: Simpson v. The State, 4 Humph. (Tenn.),
456 (1844); People v. Gardner,2 Johnson (N. Y.) 477 (1807);

Simmons v. Commonwealth, 5 Binney (Pa.), 618 (1813); State v.
Brown, 1 Haywood (N. C.), 100. The first of these cases was
afterwards, in 1834, disapproved by Mr. Chief-Justice SAVAGE
in People v. Burke, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 129. And later cases
hold that the thief may be convicted of the larceny in any
State into which be takes the goods: Hamilton v. State, 11
Ohio, 435 (1842); State v. Bennett, 14 Iowa, 482 (1863); State
v. Johnson, 2 Oregon, 115 (1864); Watson v. State, 36 Miss.
593 (1859); State v. Ellis, 3 Conn. 187 (1819); Terrill v. Commonwealth, 1 Duval, 156 (1864); State v. Underwood, 49 Me.
181 (1858); Commonwealth v. Andrews, 2 Mass. 14, 24 (1806);
Commonwealth v. Holder, 9 Gray (Mass.), 7 (1857); Commonwealth v. White, 123 Mass. 433 (1877); Worthington v. State,
58 Md. 403 (1882); Commonwealth v. Cullins, 1 Mass. 186
(1804); State v. Hill, 19 S. C. 435 (1883).
It has been argued that the rule which is applied, as between counties of the same State, as well as between the
commonwealths in the American Union, ought not to be applied where the goods have been stolen in some foreign
country and brought into one of our States. In Commonwealth v. Uprichard,3 Gray (Mass.), 434 (1855), such a distinction was recognized,*and it was decided that an indictment
could not be sustained for a larceny in Massachusetts of goods
stolen in the Province of Nova Scotia and brought from
there by the thief to Boston. This distinction was held not
to exist in The State v. Bartlett, 11 Vermont, 650, 653 (1839),
and it was decided that when oxen were stolen in Canada,
and by the thief brought into Vermont, he could be indicted
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and convicted in the latter State. And the Massachusetts
ruling was repudiated in State v. Underwood, 49 Me. 181
(1858), where a verdict was sustained for larceny against one
who stole the goods in the Province of New Brunswick and
carried them into the State of Maine.
In some States statutes have been passed governing the
matter above discussed, and in some cases the Courts have
been required to pass on the constitutionality of their provisions. Such a question was presented in The -People v.
Williams, 24 Mich. 157 (1871). The statute provided as
follows: "Every person who shall feloniously steal the property of another, in any other State or country, and shall
bring the same into this State, may be convicted and punished in the same manner as if such larceny had been committed in this State," etc. The goods in question had been
stolen in Louisiana and brought into Michigan. Mr. Justice
COOLEY, in writing the opinion sustaining the statute, said:
"Now, it may be true that this wrong would not have been
an offence within this State at the common law; but that
does not prevent its being made so by statute." The same
Court in Morrissey v. The People, 11 Mich. 327 (1863), were
equally divided in opinion as to whether the Legislature could
constitutionally provide for the punishment in Michigan of
persons who committed larceny in a foreign country and carried the stolen property into Michigan. The goods in that
case had been stolen in Canada. The question involved in
Morrissey v. The People was not discussed in the case of The
People v. Williams, as the goods in the latter case were stolen
in a sister State. But the constitutionality of a similar statute was sustained in New York, where money was stolen in
Canada and brought by the thief into New York: The People
v. Burke, supra.
In State v. Johnson, 88 Ark. 568 (1882), a statute declaring
that a person who committed larceny in one county and then
brought the stolen goods into another county, might be indicted in the latter county, was held not abrogated by a subsequent constitutional provision securing to the accused, in
all criminal prosecutions, "the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the county in which the crime
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shall have been committed." It was held that the crime was
in fact committed in the second county as well as in the first
county, as every moment's continuance of the trespass and
felony amounted to a new caption and asportation.
It has been provided by statute in some of the States, that
a person committing a burglary and larceny in one county,
and carrying the stolen property into another county, may bc
indicted, tried, and convicted for the burglary in the latter
county, as if the crime had been there committed. It is well
known that at common law such a person could not have
been convicted of burglary in the latter county, but only of
the larceny, inasmuch as the breaking and entering essential
to the crime of burglary occurred in the former county.
And the question has been raised under these statutes
whether the Legislature has the power to take away the local
character of the offence of burglary. Such a-question was
raised in Mack v. The People, 82 N. Y. 235 (1880). It was
argued that the Bill of Rights secured the individual against
a trial "unless on presentment or indictment of a grand
jury," and that this meant a grand jury of the same county
wherein the offence was committed. The Court of Appeals,
in overruling the point, said: "Doubtless, at common law,
the grand jurors were sworn ad inquirendum pro corpore comitatus, and could not regularly inquire of a fact done out of that
county, for which they were sworn. * * * But by Act of
Parliament they might be specially enabled so to do. * * *
By all rules of interpretation, then, we are to read the language
of the Bill of Rights in the light of the law as it was when
the Bill of Rights was adopted. Then, though as a rule indictments could be preferred and tried only in the county
where the offence was coinmitted, there were exceptions to
that rule of instances in which the Legislature had directed
otherwise, and the Bill of Rights must be taken to have
recognized that legislative power, and not to have intended
the abrogation of it, as there is no indication in the language
of a purpose so to do. It must be taken to have meant an"
accusation preferred by a grand jury, as authorized by law,
present and future, common law or statutory."
Under such a statute as that above referred to, it is neces-
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sary to allege in the indictment the facts which bring the case
within the statute. If the burglary was committed in the
county of A., and the goods carried into the county of B., an
indictment found in the county of B., alleging simply that
the burglary was committed in the county of A., would be
bad, and, if it alleged that it was committed in the county of
B., the evidence would show a variance. It would be necessary to allege that the burglary was committed in the county
of A., and that the goods were brought by the offender into
the county of B. : Haskins v. The People, 16 N.Y. 344 (1857).
In the law of libel, the rule is that, if a libel is published
in a newspaper printed in one State and circulated in another,
an indictment in the latter State will be sustained: Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 304 (1825). And it was
held in King v. Burdett,4 B. & Ald. 95 (1820), that a delivery
at a post-office in the county of L. of a sealed letter, inclosing a libel, was a publication of the libel in L., and that
where one wrote and published a libel in L., with the
intent to publish, and afterwards published it in the county
of M., the writer could be indicted in either county. And
see the case of The Seven Bishops, 12 State Trials, 331 (1688).
In the law relating to the obtaining of goods by false pretences, the better opinion is that the offence is committed
when the goods are obtained, no matter when the false representations may have been made. The making of false representations does not amount to a crime; the crime consists
in obtaining the goods, the false pretences simply being a
means employed to bring about that end. Hence, if the false
pretences are made in one county and the goods obtained in
a different county, the indictment should be in the latter
county: State v. House, 55 Iowa, 472 (1881); State v. Dennis,
80 Mo. 589 (1883); -Peoplev. Sully, 5 Parker 0. R. (N. Y.) 142
(1860); People v. Rathbun, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 509, 538 (1839).
And so is it, when the representations are made in one State
and the goods obtained in another: State v. Szeffer, 89 Mo.
271 (1886); Stewart v. Jessup, 51 Ind. 413 (1875); Commonwealth v. Van Tuyl, 1 Met. (Ky.) 1 (1858).
In Rex v. Lara,6 Term R. 565 (1796), it was announced that,
if a man draws a check upon a bank with which he has no
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money, and hands it as a good check tc another party, it is a
false pretence as regards that party, but not as regards the
banker. It follows, therefore, that, if A., in Michigan draws
a check on a bank in Pennsylvania in which he has no funds,
and obtains the money on that check from a bank in Michigan, which thereafter receives the money on it from the
Pennsylvania bank, the crime of obtaining money under false
pretences has been committed in Michigan, and must be punished there, and not in Pennsylvania. Such a question came
up In re Carr, 28 Kans. 1 (1882), and the above principle was
applied. The same case also shows that, if A. in Michigan
should draw a forged check on a bank in Pennsylvania, and
the Michigan bank should pay it, and then send it on to
Pennsylvania for collection, the forger would be amenable to
the law of the former, and not to that of the latter State.
But the case of The People v. Adams, 3 Denio (1N. Y.), 190
(1846), shows that, if the Michigan bank, instead of paying
the check, bad taken it for collection as the agent of the
forger, and as such actually received the money for the forger
from the Pennsylvania bank, the forger would have been
liable to indictment in the latter State for obtaining the
money under false pretences. Where money or goods are sent
by the owner by mail to one who has obtained the same by
false representations, the offender should be indicted at the
place where the money was mailed, as it is there that the
owner of the property parts with his control over it: Com,
monwealth v. Wood, 142 Mass. 459, 462 (1886).
When a forged instrument is sent by mail from one county
to an individual in another county, the crime of uttering and
publishing it is not consummated until the paper is received
by the person to whom it was sent. The. proper place of
trial, therefore, is in the county where the instrument is received, and not in the one in which it was mailed. The People v. Bathbun, supra, is an important case sustaining the
above principle, the matter having been exhaustively considered by Mr. Justice CowEN. The accused had mailed in New
York City a forged instrument to a party in Genesee County,
in the same State, and it was held that the proper place of
trial was in the county of Genesee, for the crime of uttering
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and publishing the paper in question. And the same principle is applied when the instrument is mailed in one State to
a person in another State. Such was the case in Lindsay v.
The State, 88 Ohio St. 507 (1882). A forged deed was mailed
in Missouri to a person in Ohio, where the land described in
the deed was situated. It was held that the crime of uttering
and publishing the forged paper was consummated in Ohio,
where the paper was received, and not in Missouri, where it
was mailed.
An Iowa statute on the subject of abortion provided as follows: "That any person who shall wilfully administer to
any pregnant woman any medicine, drug, substance, or thing
whatsoever, or shall use or employ any instrument or other
means whatever, with the intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of any such women, unless the same shall be necessary
to preserve the life of such woman, shall, upon conviction
thereof, be punished," etc. It was held, under this statute,
that the offence was complete when the medicine was administered, and that the jurisdiction over the offence was with
the county wherein the medicine intended to produce the
miscarriage was administered, and not with the county where
the miscarriage took place: The State v. Hollenbeck, 86 Iowa,
112 (1872). In Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 181, 164 (1857),
it was held that the oVert act of administering poison consisted not merely in prescribing or furnishing the poison, but
also in directing and causing it to be taken; so that if the
poison was prescribed and furnished in one county to a person
who carried it into another county, and then, under the directions given, took it and became poisoned and died of the
poison, the administering was consummated and the crime
committed in the county where the person was poisoned.
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